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ABSTRACT
This case study focuses on Estonia and introduces the populist and radical right-wing party of
EKRE (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond/Estonian Conservative People’s Party). It demon-
strates that EKRE’s employment of identity politics over the refugee question and immigration
is embedded inside the pre-existing frame of Estonian restoration and “decolonization”
nationalism. The party’s campaign over the refugee question and immigration interlinks the
collective memories of “colonization” under the Soviets with the collective anxieties of
becoming “colonized” again by others in the future. This sociopsychological strategy has
facilitated EKRE in augmenting its public appeal and consolidating its status as a potent actor
in Estonian politics.
Introduction
This article casts its focus on Estonia and the party of EKRE (Eesti Konservatiivne
Rahvaerakond/Estonian Conservative People’s Party). EKRE, set up in 2012, delivered a
satisfactory result in the last parliamentary elections (2015), garnering 8.1% of the vote
and seven seats (Table 1). Its public appeal is on the rise and EKRE was Estonia’s third
most popular party throughout 2017 and 2018 (Tables 2a–2d). Since 2015, the refugee
question has come to form a key component of EKRE’s campaign. This acquires a
greater significance considering that only 206 refugees from Syria and Iraq had settled
in Estonia by March 2018. In addition to capitalizing on public insecurities over the
arrival of refugees, the party previously voiced its opposition to Estonia’s new
Cohabitation Act (2016) and its provisions for LGBT rights. This article seeks to clarify
how populist and radical right-wing parties adapt to specific national contexts and how
the sociopolitical circumstances may provide opportunity structures for the emergence
of populist and radical right-wing parties in certain countries and during certain peri-
ods. This requires a more extensive discussion of Estonian political culture as well as
the particularities of its political history. The main questions addressed in this article
are the following: What are the special features of EKRE as a populist and radical right-
wing party within the Estonian context? How does the Estonian restoration and
“decolonization” nationalism interweave with EKRE’s opposition to the European
Union (EU) refugee quotas?
The first part of this article (a) begins with a theoretical discussion of the distinctions
and the main areas of concern within the populist and radical right, with a regional
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Table 1. Estonian parliamentary elections (March 2015).
Political parties Percentages (seats)
Reform Party 27.7 (30)
Centre Party 24.8 (27)
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 13.7 (14)
Social Democrats 15.2 (15)
Green Party 0.9 (0)
EKRE 8.1 (7)
Free Party 8.7 (8)
Others 0.9 (0)
Source: Estonian Electoral Commission, “Parliamentary elections 2015,” http://rk2015.vvk.ee/ (accessed
10 June 2018).
Table 2a. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia (November 2018).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Reform Party 25
Centre Party 22
EKRE 17
E-200 9
Social Democrats 6
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 5
Green Party 3
Source: “Europe Elects,” https://europeelects.eu/ (accessed 31 May 2019) (22–27 November 2018; 1,
000þ respondents).
Table 2b. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia (January 2018).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Reform Party 34.5
Centre Party 20.5
EKRE 18.4
Social Democrats 11.0
Free Party 5.4
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 4.5
Green Party 4.5
Source: “Kantar Emor Estonia,” https://www.kantaremor.ee/ (accessed 31 May 2019) (18–25 January
2018; 1,107 respondents).
Table 2c. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia (August 2017).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Centre Party 29.0
Reform Party 24.0
EKRE 12.0
Social Democrats 12.0
Free Party 6.0
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 5.0
Green Party 4.0
Source: Turu-uuringute AS, “August party ratings: Center Party ahead at 29 percent,” https://news.err.
ee/614623/august-party-ratings-center-party-ahead-at-29-percent (accessed 10 June 2018) (9–22
August 2017; 1,006 respondents).
Table 2d. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia (June 2017).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Reform Party 25.4
Centre Party 25.1
EKRE 16.2
Social Democrats 14.2
Free Party 8.5
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 6.6
Green Party 3.5
Source: Aili Vahtla, “June party ratings: Support for EKRE grows most, Reform and Centre tied,”
https://news.err.ee/603178/june-party-ratings-ekre-now-third-most-popular-party-in-estonia (accessed
10 June 2018) (9–16 June 2017; 1,125 respondents).
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focus on Central and Eastern Europe, and (b) analyzes the concepts of alien rule and
ethnic democracy with a primary focus on the restoration nationalisms of Estonia and
the Baltic States. Particular attention is paid to the aspects of universality and embed-
dedness. The main argument is that, on the one hand, EKRE largely matches the uni-
versal typology of a European populist and radical right-wing party: anti-establishment
rhetoric; Euroscepticism; and strident opposition to immigration. Nevertheless, on the
other hand, EKRE’s employment of identity politics over the refugee question and
immigration is embedded within the pre-existing frame of Estonian restoration and
decolonization nationalism. The party’s campaign interlinks the collective memories of
“colonization” under the Soviets with the collective anxieties of becoming “colonized”
again by others in the future. This socio-psychological strategy has facilitated EKRE in
augmenting its public appeal and consolidating its status as a potent actor in
Estonian politics.
In terms of methodology, this is a single-case study that suggests a general relationship in
theory building.1 The scope of this article is primarily empirical and aims at strengthening
the academic literature on right-wing populism in Estonia, the Baltic States, and, by exten-
sion, Central and Eastern Europe. The populist and radical right across the region has been
attracting the interest of scholars,2 and this includes the Baltic States.3 Nevertheless, the
increasing significance of new catalysts (namely, immigration and the controversies sur-
rounding the refugee distribution debate) and their intersection with the populist and radical
right in these societies provides an additional and urgent incentive toward the enhancement
of the academic literature on the populist and radical right in the Baltic States. More import-
ant, the systematic capitalization on anti-immigrant sentiments by the populist and radical
right throughout Central and Eastern Europe calls for updating and upgrading of the exist-
ing classification schemes for the European populist and radical right. This article demon-
strates that populist and radical right-wing parties across Europe tend to capitalize on the
socio-psychological appeal of the pre-existing traditions of nationalism within particular
national settings. Therefore, a greater number of in-depth empirical studies on the operation
of specific parties within specific countries are required.
This article relies on a qualitative and discourse analysis of EKRE’s political program
and other party documents (for example, electoral manifestos) as well as official state-
ments and declarations. In addition, semistructured interviews were carried out with
top EKRE affiliates and locally based academic researchers with an expertise in political
sociology and Estonian party politics (conducted between 2016 and 2018). Quantitative
sources such as public surveys have been of complementary importance, especially in
highlighting the growth of EKRE’s popularity over time. This article has also relied on
relevant articles from the Estonian and international press. This material has been
examined through the lens of the relevant academic literature.
The populist and radical right in Central and Eastern Europe: Internal
distinctions and primary areas of concern
Parties and issues
The spectrum of the populist and radical right in contemporary Europe is highly diverse
and idiosyncratic. Consequently, there is no universally agreed definition of what,
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precisely, constitutes populist and radical right-wing parties in the academic literature.
One can sketch out the following features that are endemic in many populist and rad-
ical right-wing parties across Europe: (a) anti-establishment rhetoric and an overriding
distinction between the people and the elite,4 (b) varying shades of Euroscepticism and
nativism,5 and (c) insistence on the hard borders principle and law and order.
A series of academic experts on the populist and radical right6 have highlighted a qualita-
tive difference between the political engagements of populist and radical right-wing parties
in Western and Eastern Europe. Whereas within the former context, the primary emphasis
is laid on anti-immigrant rhetoric, within the latter context, ethnic minorities are seen to
assume the role of scapegoats for the populist and radical right. As Lenka Bustikova puts it,
“In the more ethnically pluralistic societies, (populist and radical right-wing) parties seeking
electoral support mobilize against constitutive, larger ethnic groups, with a high degree of
politicization” (for example, the cases of Slovakia, Latvia, and Croatia).7 The author outlines
three additional features that appear to demarcate East European populist and radical right-
wing parties from their Western counterparts: (a) the assumption of left-leaning stances on
the economy, (b) the association of minority rights with democratization (and, by extension,
Europeanization), and (c) the frequent coexistence of populist and radical right-wing parties
with “radicalized” mainstream ones in their national contexts.8
Economic grievances are intertwined with identity issues because of their solid correl-
ation with national sovereignty and the capacity of nation-states to guarantee social wel-
fare to their citizens. This necessity acquires a much higher importance when viewed in
the context of the rapid privatization processes and the sets of austerity measures that
were implemented across Central and Eastern Europe during the economic transition
from communism. Hungary’s Jobbik, in particular, has consolidated an economic plat-
form (“Eco-Social National Economics”) that includes calls for the renationalization of
vital sectors of the economy.9 Less articulate “quasi-leftist” standpoints have also fea-
tured in the party programs of Ataka (Bulgaria), the League of Polish Families (Poland)
and the Slovak National Party (Slovakia).10
Furthermore, the concretization of the adequate protection of the rights and freedoms
of national minorities as one of the conditions for accepting post-Communist states
into the EU (Copenhagen Criteria, 1993)11 forged a solid bond between minority rights,
democratization, and Europeanization.12 In this light, and to a remarkable extent, the
populist and radical right in the more ethnically pluralistic societies of Central and
Eastern Europe started building their Eurosceptic platforms on varying allegations that
the EU “imposes” minority rights from the exterior and weakens national sovereignty.13
The last decade has witnessed the phenomenon of “radicalized” mainstream parties
throughout the region. Regardless of whether they are nominally center-left (for
example, Slovakia’s Direction-Social Democracy, SMER) or conservative/center-right
(for example, Hungary’s Civic Democratic Union [FIDESZ] or Poland’s Law and Justice
[PiS]), these parties have frequently defended their strident opposition to immigration
along the lines of a cultural argumentation14 and/or introduced highly controversial pol-
icies regarding the rule of law and the separation of powers (mainly FIDESZ and PiS).
This occurrence appears to have provided a trajectory, even if by default, for the flow of
ideas largely espoused by the populist and radical right into the mainstream and the
potential transformation of nominally mainstream parties.15
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Focusing specifically on the Estonian context, Siim Trumm contends that anti-immi-
gration sentiments and Euroscepticism were not of pivotal importance for the increased
public support for EKRE in the 2015 parliamentary elections.16 Largely relying on quan-
titative data from a public survey conducted jointly by the Saar polling agency and
Tartu University (March 2015), the author argues that the party’s anti-establishment
rhetoric and social conservatism had been a lot more topical for augmenting its popular
appeal.17 Trumm summarizes the “average” EKRE voter as male and socially conserva-
tive with an anti-establishment disposition.18
This theoretical overview is of substantial importance in order to situate more accur-
ately the sui generis character of EKRE’s political engagement in the empirical discus-
sion that follows. First of all, the party has been successful in incorporating a nexus that
consists of domestic ethnopolitics, regional geopolitics, as well as “new” identity politics
(that is, opposition to the EU quotas for refugees) into its anti-establishment and
Eurosceptic platform. Second, although keen on financial protectionism and economic
nationalism, EKRE does not conform to the model of a “quasi-leftist”/purely redistribu-
tive party in its economic agenda. Third, even though it originates from the structures
of the (erstwhile center-right and rather prominent) People’s Union of Estonia
(Eestimaa Rahvaliit), EKRE does not fit the pattern of a “radicalized” mainstream party
either. Lastly, as result of a “focus shift” since the second half of 2015, EKRE has been
steadily augmenting its popularity by dominating the debate against the EU refugee
quotas in Estonia.
The notion of crisis
The concept of crisis, as an active process, has been highly topical for the political
engagement of populist and radical right-wing parties across Europe. According to
Ernesto Laclau, “The emergence of populism is historically linked to a crisis of the
dominant ideological discourse which is in turn part of a more general social crisis.”19
In contemporary Europe, the new challenges that the migration crisis poses for several
societies are indissolubly linked with the political crisis of liberal democracy and, more
concretely, multiculturalism as the model for managing intergroup relations and diver-
sity. In the first instance, one might argue that this correlation does not seem highly
relevant within the context of the Central and East European societies because of the
insignificant numbers of war refugees and/or other migrants therein.
Nevertheless, what possesses pivotal importance, on this occasion, are neither the
causes nor the tangible symptoms of the social/political crisis but the successful
endeavor of political actors to convince their target groups that there is a crisis. In Cas
Mudde’s words, “… there are very few concepts as vague as ‘crisis’. People act politic-
ally not so much on the basis of actual facts, but of what they think is the truth. In that
sense, crisis is important. When people think that there is an economic or a political
crisis, they will act accordingly.”20 This brief conceptual discussion of crisis is necessary
in order to set in context EKRE’s socio-psychological campaign to (a) convince its target
groups that Estonia also forms part of the European migration crisis and (b) highlight
the pre-emptive character of its political engagement regarding the refugee question.
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Alien rule and ethnic democracy: A conceptual overview
Alien rule: Central features and the Baltic/Estonian context
In accordance with Michael Hechter, “at the most basic level, alien rule exists whenever
one or more culturally distinct groups are governed by individuals of a different cultural
group … this encompasses the legally distinct situations of colonialism, foreign occupa-
tion and multiethnic states composed of some nations whose members consider their
rulers to be alien.”21 Alien rule contains an intrinsic controversy between governance
and cultural distinctiveness that started becoming increasingly relevant after the emer-
gence of the norm of national self-determination.22 According to the same author, cul-
tural distinctiveness renders the acquisition of legitimacy, by the alien rulers over the
ruled, a particularly hard task especially on occasions when the subordinate societies are
culturally homogeneous.23 Hechter contends that a safer trajectory toward the legitim-
ization of alien rule, throughout history, has consisted of the provision of collective
goods, as well as a system of rational administration, from the rulers to the ruled.24
In the Baltic and Estonian contexts, a series of academic treatises tend to equate the
historical experience of the Baltic States under the Soviets not solely with alien but,
essentially, with colonial rule. Epp Annus sketches out three occasions on which mili-
tary occupation can combine (or not) in space with colonization. These are (a) a tem-
porary military occupation of a territory not accompanied by new settlements or
continuing subordination, (b) a military occupation accompanied by exploitation of nat-
ural resources but without the significant establishment of settlers’ colonies (for
example, British India), and (c) a military occupation accompanied by the settlement of
new inhabitants into the area and the exploitation of local resources (for example,
French Algeria).25 Despite the tangible differences with the overseas dominions of
Western colonial powers, Annus contends that the case of Estonia under Soviet rule
largely matches the third pattern.26
Kalev Kukk argues that the Soviet era in Estonia included the essential features of
colonial rule, such as (a) liquidation of the earlier economic structure, (b) establishment
of a production structure corresponding to alien interests, and (c) migration and
employment policies directed toward the assimilation of the indigenous population.27
One central actor in Estonia’s post-Soviet nation-building is the Soviet-era settlers who
often came to be depicted, en masse, in the domestic decolonization narratives as “the
colonizer.”28 This conceptual discussion of alien rule and its Baltic/Estonian adaptations
is required in order to clarify how and why EKRE, (a) at an early stage, embedded these
pre-existing narratives of colonization into its political platform and, (b) in the longer
run, has been combining these narratives with its opposition to the prospective colon-
ization (that is, the refugee quotas) that is allegedly sponsored by a new “alien ruler”
(that is, the EU).
Ethnic democracy and its Baltic/Estonian specificities
Due to the limitations in space, primary attention is paid to the conceptualization of
ethnic democracy by Sammy Smooha. Based on the Israeli precedent, Smooha defines
“ethnic democracy” as an arrangement that “combines a structured ethnic dominance
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with democratic rights for all.”29 In greater detail, ethnic democracy is “democracy that
contains the institutionalization of dominance of one ethnic group … the ‘democratic
principle’ provides equality between all citizens and members of the society while the
‘ethnic principle’ establishes preference and dominance.”30 Therefore, although provid-
ing the formal representative institutions of liberal democracy, ethnic democracy tends
to restrict the participation of certain minority groups in the political processes.
By contrast to other contested (for example, Croatia) or negotiated (for example,
Slovakia) acquisitions of independent statehood, Estonia and the other two Baltic States
officially declared their independence as part of the restoration of their interwar state-
hoods (1991). This restoration aspect enhanced the essence of symbolic decolonization
in Estonian nationalism.31 The removal of the vestiges of the Soviet past and the con-
struction of a firmer continuity between the interwar and the contemporary Estonian
statehood emerged as a top necessity.
Therefore, in accordance with the ethnic democracy model, the state institutions of
Estonia (also Latvia) have been fashioned in such a way as to mirror the “ethnic state of
the Estonians,” finally restored after its suppression by the Soviets, with an overriding
emphasis on the primacy of the Estonian language in the state bureaucracy and the
public sector.32 In addition to domestic ethnopolitics, within the contexts of post-Soviet
Latvia and Estonia, the ethnic democracy model has been legitimized as part of the
endeavor to guarantee the continuous survival of the titular nations in an insecure
international environment and in light of Russia’s leverage as the external homeland for
ethnic Russians.33 This conceptual overview is necessary in order to comprehend the
incorporation of the nexus, which consists of domestic ethnopolitics and regional geo-
politics into EKRE’s political program since the party’s early beginnings.
Introducing EKRE: Formation process and political principles
Trajectory of formation
EKRE came into existence in 2012 as the evolution of the merger between the formerly
center-right People’s Union of Estonia (Eestimaa Rahvaliit)34 and the more nationalistic
and Eurosceptic pressure group Estonian Patriotic Movement (Eesti Rahvuslik
Liikumine). In 2011, the remainder of the People’s Union commenced talks with the
Estonian Patriotic Movement, which also included EKRE’s vice-chairman, Martin
Helme. By that time, Mart Helme’s (EKRE’s current leader and Martin Helme’s father)
nationalist faction had taken over the People’s Union. In EKRE’s founding declaration,
proclaimed in the central Estonian town of P~oltsamaa (24 March 2012), the leadership
of the new party vowed to protect the national interest, preserve Estonian traditions,
and “… offer a viable alternative to the voters who are sick of the forced choice
between Andrus Ansip (the then leader of the centre-right liberal Reform Party/Eesti
Reformierakond) and Edgar Savisaar (former leader of the, nominally centrist/centre-left,
Centre Party/Eesti Keskerakond), East and West, left and right.”35
The political circumstances provided the opportunity structure for the emergence of
a new populist and radical right-wing party. Until then, the far-right end of the party
spectrum had been occupied by the Estonian Independence Party (Eesti
Iseseisvuspartei). This party never managed to win more than 0.5% of the vote, largely
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as result of its extremist profile and the unrealistic conceptualization of Estonia as a
“neo-autarkic geopolitical space” between the EU and Russia.36 Moreover, the institu-
tional framework did not provide financial incentives for parties garnering less than 1%
of the vote and the 5% threshold made it difficult for smaller parties to win seats in
parliament.37 The embedment into the pre-existing structures and power base of the
People’s Union enabled EKRE to bypass these obstacles in that the new party would not
have to commence its engagement from scratch.38 Furthermore, EKRE swiftly filled the
political gap that existed as a consequence of the Pro-Patria and Res Publica Union’s
transformation from a vocally nationalist actor, with a highly apprehensive outlook on
the ethnic Russian minority, into a “moderately nationalist” party of the center-right.39
EKRE’s evolution from within the pre-existing frame of the People’s Union somewhat
resembles the model of a “radicalized” mainstream party. Nevertheless, since EKRE’s
early beginnings, its leadership never regarded the party as even a substantially
reformed continuation (or successor party) of the People’s Union. In Martin
Helme’s words,
A sequence of leaderships in the People’s Union had been involved in corruption scandals
… the “real” history of EKRE commences in 2012 when the People’s Union merged with
the Estonian Patriotic Movement … we called for a decisive break from the corrupt past
and demanded that a brand new party with a new name and a new political platform is
set up.40
The participation of the Estonian Patriotic Movement in EKRE infused the new party
with a more youthful element that enhanced its mobilization potential and projected a
more “realistic” variant of Euroscepticism in comparison to the one espoused by the
Estonian Independence Party until then. Most important, the Estonian Patriotic
Movement undertook the principal coordinating role toward (a) structuring EKRE as a
brand-new populist and radical right-wing party with a vocally anti-establishment orien-
tation and (b) severing any apparent links to the People’s Union as an “old” party that
also formed part of the (“corrupt”) establishment in the past.
EKRE: A populist and radical right-wing party that operates in Estonia
The key objective in this section is to set in context EKRE’s universality vis-a-vis its
embeddedness. In other words, the primary objective is not to merely illustrate how
EKRE displays universal features of the European populist and radical right but rather
to highlight what is “Estonian” in the ways that the party conforms to this typology.
This will help signpost the reader more solidly toward comprehending how and why
EKRE has been embedding its campaign into the pre-existing political culture of
Estonian nationalism.
The systemization of anti-establishment speech makes up one of the most
“essentially” populist components in the party’s engagement. EKRE participated in the
debates for the formation of the new government after the rift between the Reform
Party and the Social Democrats (SDE) in November 2016 but did not make it into the
halls of power.41 First of all, there seems to be an explicit cleavage between SDE and
EKRE in most areas of policymaking. The cleavage between the two parties intensified
after the last presidential elections (2016) and Martin Helme’s firm opposition to the
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candidacy of Marina Kaljurand (former minister of foreign affairs) on the basis of her
partly Russian and partly Latvian family background.42 Furthermore, the pact between
the SDE and the Centre Party (the largest partner in the current government) was
largely reached on the basis of the necessity to revise Estonia’s neoliberal consensus and
upgrade the welfare state. In this regard, EKRE’s platform does not seem to fundamen-
tally challenge the neoliberal consensus over the management of the economy and social
welfare.43 This informal cordon sanitaire around EKRE has enabled the party to main-
tain the intensity of its anti-establishment rhetoric intact.
EKRE contends that “the current state of political affairs in Estonia favours the inter-
ests of specific segments within the society in a one-sided manner” and that it is charac-
terized by an “excessive, often undemocratic, centralization of power with no
independent vision of development.”44 EKRE’s leadership also perceives institutions
such as the media as part of the establishment. In Martin Helme’s words, “Estonian
state media are always loyal to the government and this provides them with an add-
itional incentive to depict EKRE in a negative light … the accusations of ‘racism’ that
they often levy against us mean little to the Estonian people.”45 EKRE has frequently
accused the “old” parties of opportunism and corruption. Certain specificities of the
political landscape have, if only by default, facilitated the party’s campaign. Despite the
more tangible impact of the politics of consensus, in comparison to other post-
Communist polities, Estonian politics have been revolving around a party system that is
subject to fluidity and shifting loyalties. Parties with conflicting standpoints (for
example, SDE and the Reform Party on the welfare state) have often watered down their
disagreements in order to form coalition governments.
The crisis and dissolution of the previous government is indicative of these situational
alignments and the absence of long-term consensus.46 To this one should add that,
throughout the last decade, high-profile politicians have faced charges of corruption (for
example, Edgar Savisaar during his tenure as Tallinn mayor).47 It is this intersection
between malleability in policymaking and the perceptions of political corruption within
the society that has enabled EKRE to build its image as “the only true anti-establish-
ment party in Estonia.”48 Empirical research demonstrates that the party’s employment
of anti-establishment speech has succeeded in striking a sensitive chord among its target
groups. According to a survey conducted by the political sociologist Juhan Kivir€ahk for
the Turu-uuringute AS agency (March 2018), anti-establishment rhetoric resonated with
two-thirds of the party’s voters, who also have low trust (indeed, the lowest level among
all parties) in the parliament, government, and president.49
Euroscepticism forms another important component of EKRE’s engagement with pol-
itics. EKRE’s Euroscepticism includes three dimensions: geopolitical, economic, and
sociocultural. One might argue that the embryonic origins of Euroscepticism in the
Estonian society should be traced as early as the 1990s and the accession process to the
EU. During that time, a series of public surveys detected that certain segments among
the respondents prioritized Estonia’s membership of NATO, on the basis of geopolitical
and security concerns, over the country’s accession to the EU.50 The geopolitical com-
ponent of EKRE’s Euroscepticism appears to have relied on this longer trajectory, con-
cretized it, and updated it in accordance with the present circumstances.
Correspondingly, EKRE holds that the core states within the EU allegedly underestimate
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the security threat that Russia represents for the Baltic States. The party contends that
by contrast to (former President) Toomas Hendrik Ilves’ expectations, membership of
the EU did not enhance Estonia’s security status vis-a-vis Russia.51 Moreover, EKRE
expresses its discontent over Germany’s alleged apathy in light of Russian aggression
and its ongoing cooperation with Moscow on energy issues.52
EKRE’s economic Euroscepticism largely revolves around the party’s opposition to
Estonia’s participation in the European Stability Mechanism. In the party’s own words,
Estonia’s “forced” participation in the European Stability Mechanism is “unfair, immoral
and undemocratic at the same time, yet it does not guarantee the stability and credibil-
ity of the Euro.”53 Furthermore, economic Euroscepticism frequently intercedes in
EKRE’s program and other party documents with nativism and financial protectionism.
EKRE deplores the way in which “Estonia has been partially transformed into an area
representing the interests of the EU, foreign capital and career advocacy
functionaries,”54 demands the taxation of tax-free foreign capital,55 and objects to the
acquisition of land by foreign nationals. This intersection among economic
Euroscepticism, nativism, and financial protectionism should also be understood as part
of EKRE’s endeavor to maintain the party’s grip on its predominantly rural electorate.
This claim is additionally substantiated through reference to EKRE’s simultaneous
calls for (a) the protection of domestic agricultural producers and the prioritization of
their products in the market,56 (b) the increase of EU subsidies for Estonian agricul-
ture,57 and (c) the protection of the rural environment58 and halting EU-funded infra-
structure projects (Rail Baltic, in particular) with a potentially detrimental impact on
nature.59 Lastly, the sociocultural component of EKRE’s Euroscepticism revolves around
the party’s opposition to (a) the EU’s guidelines for LGBT rights and to Estonia’s
Cohabitation Act (2016)60 and (b) the EU’s quota arrangement for the distribution
of refugees.
With regards to its economic agenda, it becomes obvious that, unlike several other
populist and radical right-wing parties across Central and Eastern Europe, EKRE cannot
be categorized as a party with a “quasi-leftist”/purely redistributive stance on the econ-
omy. In combination with its more reserved outlook on social welfare, it appears that
EKRE’s financial protectionism and economic nationalism are primarily aimed at safe-
guarding the interests of (small- and medium-size) Estonian entrepreneurs inside the
highly antagonistic context of globalized capitalism. One may contend that this more
pro–free market disposition is a rather sui generis feature of the party’s political engage-
ment, which is highly specific to the Baltic/Estonian political and socioeconomic con-
text. A series of academic experts have argued that even the neoliberal consensus on
privatization (1990s) came to be seen as the vehicle that would enable the Estonian
nation to “decolonize” from the Communist era planning and reassume full control
over the management of their country’s economy.61
EKRE’s prerogatives on citizenship and immigration are structured in such a way as
to interlink these two policy areas with the necessity to maintain Estonian–Russian rela-
tions securitized and the adoption of a stricter law and order approach. EKRE argues
that the highest posts in the state administration must be reserved only for Estonian
citizens by birth but does not object to the naturalization process of “stateless” per-
sons.62 However, naturalized individuals must give up any previous nationality and
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possess solely Estonian citizenship.63 Furthermore, EKRE’s program dictates that the
Estonian state must possess a complete and regularly updated registry of Russian
nationals living in the country.64
With regards to immigration, EKRE’s program specifies that “a fixed immigration
quota must be set and a thoughtful action plan that ensures the fast integration of
immigrants into Estonian society and culture must be implemented.”65 The linkage
between immigration policy and a law and order approach becomes particularly mani-
fest in the following excerpt: “The residence permits of foreign nationals involved in
hostile activities against Estonia must be repealed … the state can take over repatri-
ation costs to the countries of origin, in cooperation with international organizations,
if required.”66
EKRE’s party program was authored prior to the escalation of the refugee crisis since
the second half of 2015. This means that these programmatic prerogatives on immigra-
tion alone would not suffice for the party to address the complex realities of the new
state of affairs across Europe. Therefore, it started becoming evident that EKRE would
need to shift its lens from “classical” areas of engagement (domestic ethnopolitics and
the Estonian–Russian relations) to new ones (the refugee question and immigration).
Capitalizing on the politics of anti-immigration
The refugee question in Estonia: General background and political reactions
In accordance with the EU’s quota arrangement, Estonia agreed to accommodate 58,080
relocated persons (September 2016). According to the Ministry of Interior, by March
2018, 206 of them were in the country and a refugee assistance center has been func-
tioning in the locality of Vao (L€a€ane-Viru county).67 The refugee quota debate has gen-
erated controversies and engendered a “core versus periphery” cleavage within the EU:
Germany versus the Visegrad Four (also Italy, the UK, etc.). Although not as vocal as
their Central European EU partners, Estonia also expressed its reservations over the
quota system.
In July 2016, Raivo K€u€ut stated, on the Ministry of Interior’s behalf, that “Estonia
prefers case-specific decisions to the automatic redistribution of refugees by quota.”68
As early as spring 2015, the entirety of the parties at the Riigikogu (Estonian parlia-
ment) had voiced several objections to the quota arrangement on the basis that Brussels
had miscalculated Estonia’s capacities. In former Prime Minister Taavi R~oivas’s (Reform
Party) words, “The EC had made an error in its calculation and even if Estonia did wel-
come the refugees, the quota should be much lower.”69 Even the Social Democrats,
otherwise highly sensitive to humanitarian issues, voiced certain reservations over the
Commission’s directive along the lines that Estonia did not possess adequate infrastruc-
tural capacities. Moreover, on 12 September 2016, the Centre Party and EKRE submit-
ted two (rejected) draft resolutions to the Riigikogu.70 The Centre Party called for a
referendum to set a maximum limit for the number of people eligible for asylum in
Estonia. EKRE called for a referendum on Estonia’s participation in the EU’s migrant
distribution plan.
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EKRE’s engagement over the refugee question: Political rhetoric and
public appeal
EKRE specifies that “Estonia’s demographic realities do not allow mass immigration
from any direction … immigration must remain firmly under the competence of
national legislation.”71 As early as July 2015, Martin Helme dubbed the majority of asy-
lum seekers “illegitimate refugees who are looking for social welfare,” adding that “if we
came to power, EKRE would deport them.”72 Later, in the autumn, the party started its
petition campaign for a referendum on the question of Estonia accepting refugees as
a whole.73
The party appears to have harmonized its campaign over the refugee question with
the dominant mood in the public opinion. In June 2015, a survey commissioned by the
Estonian Government Office and conducted by the TNS Emor agency found that 42%
of the sample objected to the admission of refugees.74 Meanwhile, an opinion poll con-
ducted jointly by the Turu-uuringute AS agency and Tartu University (November 2015)
found that a mere 39% of the sample harbored no objections to the settlement of refu-
gees in Estonia.75 Another survey, carried out by the same agency during the same
month, found that 62% of the respondents held the opinion that the government cannot
be trusted in its management of the refugee issue.76 It was only toward the end of 2016
that an opinion poll, commissioned by the Government Office, revealed somewhat
more positive outlooks on the admission of refugees to the country (especially among
the higher educated and younger respondents).77 Nevertheless, another survey con-
ducted by Turu-uuringute AS for the Institute for Society Research (Tallinn; 16–30
January 2018) found that a majority of respondents felt that (a) Estonia should accept
only a small number of refugees and (b) it would be a positive development if the refu-
gees who arrived in Estonia left the country.78
The general apprehension vis-a-vis the refugee quota arrangement, across Estonia’s
party spectrum, does not seem to impact upon EKRE’s engagement on this issue. The
essential qualitative difference between this and the other parties consists in that EKRE
is the only party that systematized and, to a considerable extent, “weaponized” its
opposition to the EU refugee quotas through means of mass mobilization. As early as 6
February 2016, EKRE was intensifying and internationalizing its engagement via staging
countrywide protests against “the Islamization of Europe” (including Germany’s Pegida
and other grassroots initiatives).79 Particular attention was paid to the wave of sexual
assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2016 and the ensuing “necessity to protect
Estonian and European women.” These incidents were interpreted as “the shape of
things to come” for the entire continent, if Germany and Brussels insist on an “open
border” approach to Muslim immigration.80
In contrast to the cases of FIDESZ, PiS, and/or SMER, the Estonian party spectrum
does not include any “radicalized” larger parties with the desire to weaponize their
reluctance toward the refugee quotas in a potential affront with the EU. This absence of
contenders has enabled EKRE not solely to capitalize on the anti-refugee debate but
also to anchor its campaign against the refugee quotas within the frame of its
Euroscepticism and anti-establishment discourse in domestic politics. On the one hand,
the party held the EU accountable for, once again, forcing its directives on Estonia in
such a manner that it disregards and contravenes the will of the majority.81 On the
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other hand, the government is being held accountable for ignoring the “will of the peo-
ple” and “lying to the public.”82
Situating the present and the future inside the context of the past
The causes of anti-immigrant sentiments may vary remarkably from one society to the
other. Meanwhile, political parties and groupings that stress the hard borders principle
tend to anchor their narratives primarily into symbols and imageries derived from their
own societies’ historical experiences. Locating the present, or occasionally the future, in
the context of the past is a common technique among nationalist actors that helps inter-
pret developments along a linear trajectory and satisfy the quest for meaning among
their bases of support.83
The urgent necessity to repair the physical damage and reverse the psychological
trauma inflicted on the Baltic nations during the Soviet era is repeatedly stressed by
EKRE and its allied parties in the Baltic States.84 In the text of the “Bauska
Declaration,” signed jointly by EKRE, Latvia’s National Alliance, and Lithuania’s
Nationalists’ Union (2013), it is stated that “we stand firm to the demand of compensa-
tions for occupation by Soviet Communist regime … acknowledgement of the occupa-
tion and full compensation for it should serve as a guarantee against any other
occupation and aggression to recur.”
As Siim Trumm puts it, “Electoral support for populist right-wing parties is influ-
enced by their ability to tap on the ‘right’ type of disillusionment when choosing their
public discourse.”85 With regards to EKRE, since the second half of 2015, it started
becoming an imperative for the party’s strategy to embed their opposition to the EU’s
refugee quotas within the colonization and decolonization narratives of Estonian nation-
alism. In particular, the refugee question often interweaves in the party’s speech with
concerns over the “(East) Slavic immigration to Estonia”86 and the fears that this may
result in “a new colonization and the demographic prevalence of Russian-speakers over
Estonians in the next 30 years.”87 As Toomas Hendrik Ilves subtly hinted, public reser-
vations over the refugee question and immigration should not be disconnected from the
colonization under the Soviets and its long-term ramifications.88 Therefore, identity and
memory politics and their selective appropriation appear to have gained precedence
over the minuscule presence of war refugees in Estonia and evolved into a key compo-
nent in EKRE’s engagement in Estonian politics.
Quantitative data hint that EKRE’s engagement with the refugee question has suc-
ceeded in touching a sensitive cord among its target groups. A public survey conducted
by Turu-uuringute AS (22–28 March 2016) detected a clear link between EKRE’s capit-
alization on anti-refugee rhetoric (especially after the Brussels terrorist attacks on 22
March 2016) and the party’s increase in popularity (Table 3). In accordance with the
findings of this survey, EKRE’s popularity jumped from an estimated 13% to 19%
immediately after the Brussels bombings.89 These observations largely correspond with
the findings of the Erakonnad monitoring service (hosted by TNS Emor AS) that hint
at the correlation between the intensification of the refugee quota debate, on EKRE’s
behalf, and the increase in the party’s popularity from 2015 until 2018.90
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EKRE appears to have succeeded in convincing its target groups not solely that
Estonia forms part of the larger refugee crisis throughout Europe but also about the
preemptive character of its engagement. This largely consists of tentative correlations
between the (increased) physical presence of Muslim communities and the future
prospects for the import of terrorism and/or other asymmetric threats. In Martin
Helme’s words, “Global terrorism poses a security threat for Estonia but this is
lower in comparison to Western Europe … the number of Muslim immigrants
from the Middle East and North Africa who are based in Estonia is small. However,
the refugee quota arrangement, dictated by the EU, can generate perils in the imme-
diate future.”91
EKRE has not explicitly adopted the “EUSSR”92 narrative, as espoused by various
Eurosceptic actors, with regards to the fashion in which the EU allegedly imposes its
directives.93 However, its leadership has occasionally alluded to tentative correlations
between the EU and the Soviet Union.94 In contrast to the more abstract and metaphor-
ical uses of such correlations by populist and radical right-wing parties elsewhere in
Europe, the historical and sociocultural specifics can render this socio-psychological
strategy a lot more appealing and successful inside the Estonian context. In this regard,
EKRE’s leadership has been capitalizing rather steadily on the disillusionment among
certain cohorts of the electorate with the effort invested during Estonia’s accession pro-
cess to the EU (1990s) and the actual state of affairs inside the Union.95
Conclusions
EKRE is a party with an increasing appeal among the Estonian voters. The main object-
ive of this case study was to position the party’s universality vis-a-vis its embeddedness
inside Estonia’s political and sociocultural context. EKRE’s political engagement includes
three aspects that appear to be universal among the European populist and radical right:
(a) anti-establishment rhetoric, (b) Euroscepticism and nativism, and (c) opposition to
immigration and insistence on the hard borders principle. Throughout Europe, to vary-
ing degrees, the political engagement along these three pillars has enabled parties of the
populist and radical right to fill in existing gaps and augment their popularity among
their respective electorates.
Nevertheless, EKRE displays a set of distinctive specificities, in comparison to other
populist and radical right-wing parties across Central and Eastern Europe, that result
from its political engagement inside the Baltic/Estonian context. First, EKRE’s geopolit-
ical Euroscepticism is solidly embedded in the anxieties over Estonia’s security status
Table 3. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia (March 2016).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Centre Party 25
Reform Party 23
EKRE 19
Social Democrats 13
Free Party 12
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union 6
Source: Turu-uuringute AS, https://www.postimees.ee/3637703/uuring-brusseli-terrorirunnak-tostis-ekre-
toetuse-reformierakonna-kannule (accessed 10 June 2018) (22–28 March 2016; 1,000 respondents).
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vis-a-vis Russia’s disproportional leverage. Second, EKRE is characterized by a more
pro–free market orientation that is aimed at safeguarding the interests of (small- and
medium-size) Estonian entrepreneurs inside the highly antagonistic context of global-
ized capitalism. One can seek the origins of this policy pattern in pre-existing interpre-
tations of the neoliberal consensus over the economy (1990s) as another trajectory that
would enable the Estonian nation to decolonize from the Communist-era planning and
reassume full control over the management of their country’s economy. Lastly, EKRE is
not a “radicalized” mainstream party and, unlike the Visegrad Four states, the Estonian
party spectrum does not include any “radicalized” larger parties either. This has pro-
vided EKRE with plenty of room for campaigning over the refugee question and
immigration.
EKRE appears to subscribe to the universal trend, among the populist and radical right
across Central and Eastern Europe, to weaponize the refugee crisis. This is reflected in the
internationalization of the party’s engagement over this issue. Nevertheless, since the second
half of 2015, EKRE has also been embedding its opposition to the EU’s refugee quotas
arrangement inside the more particularistic colonization and decolonization narratives of
Estonian nationalism. In contrast to the more abstract and metaphorical uses of correlations
between the USSR and the EU by populist and radical right-wing parties elsewhere in
Europe, the historical and sociocultural specifics can render this socio-psychological strategy
a lot more appealing and successful in the Estonian context.
As becomes clear in this case study, the existing classification schemes for the
European populist and radical right need to be updated and upgraded. In contrast to
the older treatises on the populist and radical right in Central and Eastern Europe and
their greater stress on the apprehension of these parties toward ethnic minorities,
empirical research demonstrates that EKRE and other parties throughout the region
have been seeking to augment their popularity along the systemization of anti-immi-
grant engagement.96 In particular, an emerging nexus that appears to be rather com-
monplace among parties of the populist and radical right in Central and Eastern
Europe is the one that consists of domestic ethnopolitics, regional geopolitics, and
“new” identity politics (namely, anti-immigration). This nexus, in turn, seems to be
firmly anchored inside the Eurosceptic and anti-establishment agendas of these parties.
In all of this, it should be borne in mind that the trajectories toward capitalizing on
anti-immigration sentiments have been rather idiosyncratic across Europe. Anti-immi-
gration parties and groupings tend to embed their narratives primarily into symbols
and imageries derived from their own societies’ historical experiences. In this light, the
cooperation between academic experts in nationalism and academic experts on the
populist and radical right needs to become more extensive and systematic. On the one
hand, this will enable experts in nationalism to assess more precisely the degree to
which new variables such as Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant trends can reshape eth-
nopolitics, both as a living reality and as a field of study, across Central and Eastern
Europe. On the other hand, this systematic cooperation will enable experts in the popu-
list and radical right to formulate new interpretative models about how (right-wing)
populist and Eurosceptic actors across this region embed their agendas inside the pre-
existing political cultures of nationalism and particularistic identity and mem-
ory politics.
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